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It is as widely agreed as anything in philosophy that some words – “I”,
“she”, “that” – are context-sensitive, and it is as controversial as anything
in philosophy whether some other words are – “knows” prominent among
them. But what are we agreeing to when we agree that “I” is context-sensitive,
and what are we disagreeing about when we disagree whether “knows” is?
We all know an answer to this question: “I” is (and “knows” might be)
context sensitive as a matter of its meaning ; it is semantically context-sensitive.
But in the absence of further explanation, “semantics” and “meaning” are
little more than labels for the problem: what does it mean to say that a word
is semantically context sensitive?
There are various kinds of answer to this and related questions in the
literature: some rely on some pre-theoretical understanding of meaning –
for example, what is said by an utterance of a sentence – claiming that a sen-
tence is context sensitive just in case what is said by utterances of it varies
depending on the situation in which the utterances are made; others say
linguistics (hence semantics) is a branch of psychology, concerned with the
operation of some bit of the human brain, so that the claim that a word is
context-sensitive must be capturing some sort of psychological fact; accord-
ing to others, semantics aims at characterizing certain linguistic conventions
(and is thus perhaps closer to a branch of sociology), so that the claim that
a word is context-sensitive must be capturing some conventional fact; and
of course there are other possibilities. This chapter surveys a range of views
about the aim of semantics and the nature of semantic fact, with an eye to-
ward connecting some relevant disputes about the nature of context and
context-sensitivity. I begin by setting out some presuppositions of the discus-
sion; subsequent sections focus on the various views of semantics and their
consequences for our take on context sensitivity.
1 Ground Clearing
In order to keep this paper to a reasonable length, I will focus on one kind of
semantic framework in which the titular question can be posed: the frame-
work of the “model theoretic” tradition,1 according to which a semantic the-
1The scare quotes are because it is not clear that models play a very substantial role in
natural language semantics; see Glanzberg (2014) for discussion.
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ory assigns semantic values – typically set-theoretic entities such as functions
– to atomic expressions, and describes composition rules by which the se-
mantic values of complex expressions can be determined on the basis of the
semantic values of their component expressions and their syntactic struc-
ture. Work on context sensitivity in this tradition takes its cue from the treat-
ment of context in Montague (1974c; 1974a), Lewis (1970), and Kaplan
(1977): contexts are ordered tuples consisting of (something like, perhaps
inter alia) a world, time, and speaker;2 and semantic values – or at least, one
kind of semantic value, which we will call characters – are functions from con-
texts to entities of some other kind – for example, the character of a sentence
might be a function from contexts to functions from worlds to truth values.3
(Since it is possible to be misled by terminology, let me reiterate that I am
using “character” and “context” to pick out set-theoretic entities.)
My attention to theories of this kind ismostly for expository convenience;
the questions we will consider would arise for most other frameworks that
try to treat context-sensitivity.But this sort of framework makes certain ques-
tions particularly natural and easy to ask. No one thinks that there is an
interesting association in the world, independent of the theoretical activity
of linguists and philosophers, between the word “I” (say) and a certain func-
tion. Functions are theorists’ tools; semanticists are using them to represent
something about language.4 But what are they representing?
We can ask this question about semantic theorizing in general, and also
about particular aspects of a semantic theory. The treatment of context-
sensitivity that we have just sketched has two main moving parts – the de-
scription of an ordered tuple (the context) with elements of certain kinds,
and the assignment of characters as the semantic value of expressions – and
our key questions will be about the representational role of each of these:
Context Representation What do the elements of context represent? What
2Kaplan (1977) does not explicitly endorse this view of context. In his formal system, he
simply stipulates that there is a set of contexts C , but says nothing about the nature of the
members of C except that for each c in C , cA is the agent of c, cT is the time of c, etc., and
that A, T , etc. “may be thought of as functions applying to contexts” (1977: 552), so that
(e.g.) cA is the result of applying A to c. The view that contexts are tuples seems a natural
fit with the bulk of Kaplan’s commitments, so I will proceed with that view in discussion.
3The sorts of questions that are the focus of this chapter could equally well be posed with
respect to Lewis (1980)-style “constant but complicated” semantic values; I focus on a Kaplan-
style system because of its familiarity in philosophical discussions of context-sensitivity.
4On one view, attributed to Montague by Thomason (1974: 2), languages just are math-
ematical entities. Perhaps a proponent of this view would claim that the association between
“I” and a certain function does exist independently of the activities of theorists; it is, in effect,
just a mathematical fact, nomore dependent on theoretical activity (and nomore in the busi-
ness of representing something about language use) than the fact that 2+2=4. Though I do
not deny that this thought is worth taking seriously, I find it hard to relate it to the practice
of semantic theorizing with which I am familiar. I therefore propose to set it aside.
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does it mean when we include a particular parameter (location, say)
in the context?
Character Representation What does the assignment of a particular charac-
ter to an expression represent about that expression?
These are the questions that I will sketch some answers to in what follows.5
2 The Meaning Perspective
What phenomenon does a semantic theory aim to represent or character-
ize? We have already noted that there are a variety of possible answers to
this question. I want to begin with a relatively straightforward one. Prior to
systematic semantic theorizing, we have various semantic concepts: mean-
ing, reference, what is said (by a person or by an utterance), truth, and so
forth. The Meaning Perspective has it that the job of a semantic theory is to
systematize and explain facts about meaning in some pre-theoretical sense
– for example, facts about what is said, or about the information commu-
nicated by an utterance, or about the truth and falsity of utterances. For
example, Larson and Segal claim that facts about the “actual meanings that
[...] expressions have”, such as the fact that “The English sentence Camels
have humps means that camels have humps” are “the primary data that we
would want any semantic theory to account for” (1995: 2). And it is clear
that Kaplan (e.g., (1977: 492-4)) takes facts about reference and what is said
by utterances to be among the facts that semantic theory must explain. (Ka-
plan introduces the term “content” as a synonym for “what is said” (1977:
500).)
A few clarifications are in order. First, the idea need not be that we
are just systematizing our pre-theoretic judgements about some class of se-
mantic phenomena. Plausibly, we should allow that our judgements can be
revised in light of theory (for example, in the way judgements about what is
said can be revised once one is aware of pragmatic phenomena such as im-
plicature). Moreover, we should want more than a systematization of some
data; good semantic theories explain. Second, on most conceptions of se-
5Considerations of space prevent me from discussing several relevant issues (despite the
fact that they are probably essential to understanding context-sensitivity, and are among the
areas where the most interesting recent work on issues related to context sensitivity has taken
place): notable among them, the extent of context-sensitivity in natural language (most of
the discussion will focus on pronouns, and we will generally assume a fairly standard list
of context-sensitive expressions), binding and anaphora (our attention will exclusively be
directed at so-called deictic uses – i.e., uses “whose interpretations are not drawn from the
immediate linguistic context” (Nunberg 1993: 12)), and the role of logic in semantic theory
(something that played a crucial role in Kaplan’s thinking about context-sensitivity, but (as
far as I know) very little role in debates about epistemic contextualism).
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mantics, the idea is not that we explain all of the semantic facts. Rather, at
least to a first approximation, we take for granted the semantic facts about
atomic expressions, and use them (along with composition rules and syntac-
tic structure) to explain semantic facts about complex expressions such as
sentences. Third, we have already mentioned other approaches to seman-
tics, according to which semantics aims to describe facts about psychology, or
about social convention. The proponent of the Meaning Perspective need
not deny that facts about meaning in her preferred sense are ultimately psy-
chological (or sociological, etc.) in nature; for example, she might claim
that meaning facts are ultimately grounded in (or reducible to, or super-
venient on) psychological facts, but still maintain that semantics is its own
special science, for nearly all practical purposes independent of psychology
(in much the way the study of economics is for all practical purposes inde-
pendent of physics, even though (at least on a physicalist world view) facts
about economics are ultimately a matter of physics).
To fix ideas, let’s suppose (with Kaplan) that our theory is designed to
make predictions about what is said by utterances of sentences. (“I beganmy
investigation by asking what is said when a speaker points at someone and
says, ’He is suspicious”’ (Kaplan 1977: 489).) The observation that moti-
vates Kaplan’s theorizing about context sensitivity is that what is said by one
and the same sentence varies depending on the situation in which it is ut-
tered. When I utter “I am hungry”, what is said is that Derek is hungry; when
Jonathan utters the same sentence, what is said is that he is hungry. In or-
der to make predictions about what is said by an utterance of a sentence, we
need more information about that utterance; in the case at hand, informa-
tion about who made it. Let us call a situation in which an utterance might
take place – either actual, located in space and time, or possible, the kind
of thing that would be located in space and time if it were actual – a concrete
situation. To a first approximation, contexts represent concrete situations.
Following Kaplan (1977: 522-3,546), we should distinguish sentences-in-
contexts (or “occurrences”) from utterances: utterances are speech acts,
events that take place in space and time, while sentences-in-contexts are for-
mal entities – something like an ordered pair of a sentence and a context.
The natural (from the Meaning Perspective) idea that we are exploring is
that sentences-in-contexts represent possible utterances.6
6Is this natural idea undermined by the fact that we can evaluate sentences at contexts
that represent concrete situations in which no utterance is taking place? Perhaps, but there
is much to be discussed; exactly how we regard such contexts will turn on our answers to the
questions about the target of semantic theorising and the representational role of context
that are among the topics of the rest of this chapter. Those worried about this detail may
take the idea under discussion to be that at least some sentences-in-contexts represent possible
utterances.
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Let’s try to fill in the details. We are considering approaches to semantics
on which the semantic values of sentences are mathematical objects. One
standard assumption is that what is said by a sentence in a context is repre-
sented by a function from indices – usually thought of as a possible world, or
a tuple consisting of a possible world and other parameters – to truth values;
on the assumption that the index is just a world, it will be the function that
maps a world to truth just in case what is said by the sentence in the context
is true at that world, and to falsity otherwise. So the character of a sentence
will be a function from contexts to functions from indices to truth values.
Context is an ordered tuple. We need this tuple to give us enough informa-
tion to generate our representation of what is said. The question then is:
what values can we assign to elements of the context to ensure that this is
possible? In order to answer this question, we will have to say more about
how intensions work.
3 Character and Context from the Meaning Perspective
Our representations of what is said are functions from indices to truth values.
We will also assign functions (from indices to other entities) to sub-sentential
expressions. All such functions from indices to other entities are known as
intensions. The result of applying an intension to an index is an extension.
The extension of a sentence is standardly assumed to be a truth value; the
extension of a proper name might be an individual. A fairly standard as-
sumption is that the intension of a sentence, and its extension at a given
index, are determined in a systematic way – in the jargon, compositionally –
by the intensions of its sub-sentential components, their extensions at that
index, and the sentence’s syntactic structure (though see the discussion of
monsters in section 6 below).7 (These components may include elements
that are syntactically realized but unpronounced, and we will use the term
“expression” to include these elements.)
We can take the syntactic structure as given. Since an intension, given an
index, determines an extension, what we will need from context is enough
information to determine the intensions of context-sensitive expressions.
And in fact, it is typically assumed that we need less than this; on standard
theories, the members of context are extensions: a speaker, time, world, and
so forth. An intension determines an extension (given an index), but it is
not typically the case that an extension determines an intension. (For exam-
7I have said that intensions are our representations of what is said, and I am here assuming
that those same intensions play a compositional role. But what plays a compositional role
need not be identical to the representation what is said, even on the Meaning Perspective;
on some views, the representation of what is said can be determined from (but is not identical
to) compositional semantic value. See Rabern (2012); Ninan (2010) for discussion. For the
sake of ease of discussion, I set this complication aside.
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ple, if intensions are functions from worlds to truth values, there are many
intensions that map the actual world to Truth.) But context-sensitive expres-
sions are usually held to be a special case. Intensions are needed to make
sense of the behavior of expressions in modal contexts, “belief” contexts,
and the like. But familiar context-sensitive words are rigid designators: they
are, or at least seem to be, unaffected by modal contexts. So it makes sense
to give them constant intensions: functions thatmap every index to the same
value. For example, the intension of “I” at a particular context in which I
am the speaker might be the function that maps every index to Derek. If we
assume that the intensions of context-sensitive expressions are all constant
functions, then we can determine intensions on the basis of extensions: if
the extension of a context-sensitive expression is e, its intension will be a
constant function from indices to e.
With this in mind, there is a simple way to ensure that we have the in-
formation we need: we can simply let the members of context be the exten-
sions of context-sensitive words. (For example, if we are only interested in
“I” and “that”, the context might be an ordered pair < ac; tc >, where ac
is a speaker (i.e., the extension of “I”) and tc is an object (the extension of
“that”).8 ) Call this the Simple Strategy.
The Simple Strategy is advocated explicitly by David Lewis (1970: 24,
62-5) and David Braun (1996: 161). And it may seem an attractive view
from the Meaning Perspective. After all, the Meaning Perspective has it that
our objective is to capture facts about some pre-theoretic notion of meaning
such as what is said. In the case of context-insensitive words, it is not part of
the job of semantics to explain how atomic expressions get their intensions
and extensions. Why should the situation be any different with respect to
context sensitive vocabulary? We will return to some possible answers to
this question momentarily; first, let’s see how the Simple Strategy can be
developed.
Character, on the Simple Strategy, is a function that maps contexts to
constant intensions (which map every world to a particular parameter of the
context); for example, the character of “I” will be a function from contexts
to functions from worlds to the first member of the context. Formally, we
can write:
(1) JIK = [c:[i:ac]]
(2) JIKc;i = JIK(c)(i) = ac
(Where [c:[i:ac]] is the function that maps every context c to a constant
8Things will need to be more complicated to handle repeated uses of the same context
sensitive word, as in “That is not identical to that”. Lewis (1970: 62-3) suggests a technical
solution (which he attributes to Kaplan); other approaches might see this as a case of context
shifting mid-sentence.
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function from indices to the first member of c.)
Formally, the Simple Strategy is a simple as the name suggests. But what
are we representing by describing contexts and assigning characters of this
kind? The Meaning Perspective has it that we are representing facts about
possible situations in which utterances might take place, and facts about sen-
tences that enable us to make predictions about what would be said by utter-
ances of those sentences in those possible situations. But the Simple Strate-
gist’s context will end up being a long and (depending on what context-
sensitive expressions there turn out to be) diverse sequence of entities. In
what sense does this represent a possible situation?
There is a straightforward way to represent a concrete situation: by giv-
ing us enough information to pick it out of the space of possibilities. This is
the notion of context familiar from Lewis (1980: pp . 28-9) and others: an
ordered triple consisting of a speaker, time, and world: < a; t; w >.9 (Lo-
cation, time, and world would work just as well for most purposes, but we will
assume that the first parameter picks out an agent.) Call this the straightfor-
ward context. It is clear that context as appealed to in the Simple Strategy is
not straightforward context. (If we had only a few context sensitive expres-
sions – just “I” or “here”, “now”, and “actual” – the Simple Strategy’s con-
text would just be the straightforward context. But even “that” makes things
more complicated.) The Simple Strategy’s context represents a speech situ-
ation indirectly, by including the semantic values that various context sensi-
tive expression would have in that context. Each member of the sequence
corresponds to a particular type of context sensitive expression; for exam-
ple, the first member might correspond to “I”, the second to “that”, and so
on.
This, then, is the Simple Strategy’s answer to the Context Representation
question:
Context Representation (Meaning Perspective/Simple Strategy) Context rep-
resents a concrete situation by giving the extensions that context sen-
sitive expressions would have if uttered in that situation. Each pa-
rameter in the context corresponds to a particular context sensitive
expression in the language.
On the Simple Strategy, characters are trivial: they only point us to a par-
ticular member (the first, say, or the fourteenth) of the context. This works
because we are assigning particular values to the parameters of contexts in
a systematic way, depending on facts about the concrete situation that we
are trying to represent. There is an interesting question here: why do we
assign particular values to the parameters of the context that corresponds to
9See Liao (2012) for doubts about the adequacy of this representation of context.
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a particular concrete situation? To answer this question would be in effect to
give a metasemantic theory for context-sensitive expressions: an interesting
project, but not one that the Simple Strategist needs to undertake as long as
she can somehow give extensions for the expressions under study in a range
of relevant cases.
The Simple Strategy will assign some expressions constant characters –
functions that map every context to the same intension – and other expres-
sions variable characters. If an expression is assigned a variable character,
that indicates that its contribution to what is said depends on the concrete
situation in which it is used. And because intensions are a particular way
of representing what is said, and characters are functions from contexts to
intensions, characters are defined in terms of our representation of what is
said. But characters themselves are doing little work; they serve only as for-
mal devices to retrieve information from context. Simplifying somewhat to
put the point bluntly:
Character Representation (Meaning Perspective/Simple Strategy) Characters
have no representational significance.
Now I want to turn to two objections to the Simple Strategy. The first
objection is empirical: there are data that seem to be a matter of meaning
in a pre-theoretical sense that the Simple Strategy just does not explain. The
simplest sort of data has to do with infelicity. Suppose I gesture at my favorite
chair and say, “He is comfortable”, intending to refer to the chair (and not,
for example, to make a deferred reference to a person who had been sitting
there). Something has clearly gone wrong, and though one could argue
about exactly what it is, it seems clearly to be a matter of meaning of the sort
that one might want a semantic theory to capture. Or, to take a subtler sort
of example, Nunberg (1993: 34) points out that although “that” and “it” are
in some respects very similar, it makes sense to say, upon seeing the face of
a certain baseball player, “That’s my favorite team,” but much less sense to
say, “It’s my favorite team.” Why?
The Simple Strategy has no resources to answer these questions. On
the Simple Strategy, context delivers intensions and extensions for context-
sensitive expressions, but does not explain how or why these expressions get
the intensions and extensions they do. It therefore can offer no account of
whether and when these expressions might have no intensions and exten-
sions (or of what else might be going on, if the examples are problematic for
some other reason). Note that the objection isn’t that the Simple Strategy
gets things wrong – one could set up contexts to deliver the right predic-
tions here.10 Rather, it is that the Simple Strategy is incomplete. There
10Perhaps the simplest move would be to adopt a representational convention that allowed
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is explanatory work to do that the Simple Strategy is not well equipped to
tackle.
The second objection to the Simple Strategy, due originally to Cresswell
(1973: 111), trades on the fact that it is an open question exactly which
words are context sensitive. If very many (or perhaps even all) expressions
are context-sensitive, contexts will become unwieldy; perhaps, if we aim to
treat all possible context-sensitivity in natural language, the list will become
infinite. So the Simple Strategy threatens to make the task of stating a se-
mantic theory difficult or impossible.11
David Lewis (1980) took Cresswell’s objection to motivate a shift to the
straightforward notion of context, and this clearly requires a corresponding
shift in the view of character. Accepting the straightforward notion of con-
text delivers a correspondingly straightforward answer to the context repre-
sentation question:
Context Representation (Straightforward) Context represents a concrete sit-
uation by giving information that would enable one to pick it out in
the space of possible concrete situations.
As Lewis points out, if facts about a concrete situation determine semantic
facts, and straightforward context gives us enough information to pick out a
concrete situation, then straightforward context should give us enough in-
formation to determine semantic facts – we just need to engineer characters
that can do the work.
What would such characters represent? One possibility is that they are
representing facts about how an expression’s contribution to what is said is
determined. But this raises a question: more or less every expression con-
tributes something to what is said, and (plausibly) in every case this is de-
termined by facts about the concrete situation. So what is special about “I”
and its ilk? Why do we assign proper names (say) constant characters, rather
than characters that represent the metasemantic facts about how their con-
tribution to what is said is determined (so that, for example, the character of
“Derek” might be something like [c:i: the object at the end of the causal
chain that leads to ac’s use of “Derek” at tc in wc])?
12
gappy contexts – contexts that include no extension for certain context-sensitive expressions.
See Braun (2005: esp. 621-2 n. 6) for a related idea applied to the use of tuples to represent
structured propositions.
11Cresswell-style objections may not be fatal to the deployment of the Simple Strategy in
limited ways. If we are interested in developing a theory that explains some particular linguis-
tic phenomenon, rather than in capturing the full range of context sensitivity in language,
the Simple Strategy may be a useful tool that enables us to abstract away from distracting fac-
tors. Neale (2004: 96) calls this style of use of the Simple Strategy methodological anchoring.
12The presupposition of the question – that we assign (or should assign) names constant
characters – can be doubted; see Recanati (1993: ch. 8).
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One possible answer is that characters represent another pre-theoretic
notion of meaning, one on which different uses of “I” have the same mean-
ing even when they make different contributions to what is said.13 Although
it is plausible that there is such a sense, it is not clear that it is precisely
enough delineated to bear serious theoretical weight. (Do all tokens of
“that” have the same meaning in this sense? Do they have the same mean-
ing as tokens of “this”? If not, in what does the difference consist? What of
unpronounced expressions, such as (on one view) restrictions on quantifier
domains?) There seems to be a need for further theoretical work. A natural
place to start is Kaplan’s thought that character is a “semantical rule” (1977:
520). But there are different ways that this idea might be developed. We
turn to these in the next section.
4 The Rules Perspective: Psychology
Rules and rule following are extremely difficult and controversial issues in
philosophy, especially in the context of semantics, and we cannot discuss
most of the deep questions here. Instead, the aim will be to sketch some
conceptions of semantics on which something worth thinking of as a kind
of rule enters into the picture, and to discuss some ways these views might
relate to controversies about context sensitivity and its representation.
The first type of view has it that semantics aims to capture something
about the psychology of language users. On the most prominent version of
this style of view (associated with Chomsky and his followers (e.g., Chom-
sky (1986: ch. 4))) the project is to capture what is represented in or by a
certain psychological mechanism – to use Chomsky’s technical term, what
is cognized. In the case of syntax, the traditional view has it that what is cog-
nized is rules, which recursively determine the grammatical sentences of the
language. The natural extension to semantics would have it that what is
cognized is rules that compositionally determine the semantic facts about
sentences (e.g., Larson & Segal (1995: 9-12), Borg (2004: ch. 2)).
There are a variety of ways of developing this kind of view. One strategy is
to build on theMeaning Perspective. We often can come to know what is said
by utterances in various circumstances. One task would be to characterize
the psychological mechanism by which we do this. On the hypothesis that
this mechanism works in a broadly computational way, the task would be to
characterize the representations that are implicated in the functioning of
this mechanism.
Another strategy would be to regard the project of characterizing cer-
tain mental representations as supplanting, rather than supplementing, the
Meaning Perspective. On this view, pre-theoretical notions of meaning are
13Another
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to be viewed with skepticism, as riddled with unclarity and imprecision of a
sort that makes them unsuitable for serious theorizing. What is cognized is
seen as a more tractable replacement for these notions. Exactly what sort
of thing it is that speakers cognize should be treated as an empirical ques-
tion. One hypothesis, naturally suggested by the psychological focus, is that
semantics gives rules associating linguistic expressions with concepts (Jack-
endoff 2002). Another attitude is that we should remain agnostic on this
question until more evidence is in (Yalcin 2014).
What might characters look like on this kind of view? The details may
depend to some extent on exactly what we want to represent and how we
want to represent it. To keep discussion manageable, I will focus on the view
that we aim to represent themental representations underlying our ability to
determine what is said. Suppose we begin by assuming that we are working
with the straightforward context. Now we might state the character of “I” in
precisely the same way as before. But we are now thinking of this character as
doing some representational work: speakers know that when someone uses
“I”, they are speaking of themselves, and the character of “I” represents this
knowledge. This gives an answer to the Character Representation question:
Character Representation (Rules Perspective - Psychology) Characters are a
theoretical representation of the mental representations that under-
lie speakers’ linguistic competence.
The contrast between the Simple Strategy and the psychological ver-
sion of the Rules Perspective now under consideration is easier to see with
context-sensitive expressions that do not relate in a simple way to an element
of the straightforward context. Suppose that the referent of “that” is deter-
mined by speaker intentions. We want to describe what speakers know in
virtue of which they can extract a word’s contribution to what is said from a
concrete situation. So the character of “that” might be something like:
(3) JthatK= [c:[i: the object of ac’s referential intention in c]]
We are now in a position to begin to answer the empirical argument
presented at the end of the previous section. Consider the case where I
attempt to use “he” to pick out an inanimate object. Now it is a rule, which
competent speakers cognize, that “he” cannot be used in this way. Suppose
we decide that the consequence of suchmisuse is that nothing is said. We can
represent this knowledge by making the character of “he” a partial function
– i.e., a function that maps contexts in which the speaker-intended object
is a human male to intensions, and that fails to map contexts in which the
speaker-intended object is not a human male to anything at all. Formally,
we can write (using the -notation as in Heim & Kratzer (1998: 34-5)):
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(4) JheK= [c : the object of ac’s referential intention in c is a human
male :[i: the object of ac’s referential intention in c]]
What of Nunberg’s observation that “that” allows deferred reference –
i.e., in the case of a demonstrative, reference to something other than the
demonstrated object, such as using a demonstrated player to refer to a team
– while “it” does not? Nunberg suggests that demonstrated objects play a
special role in the semantics of some context-sensitive expressions. For ex-
ample, “that” picks out an object that is related in some intended way to a
demonstrated object; demonstrated objects become “pointers to interpreta-
tions” (1993: 38). “It”, on the other hand, has no use for a demonstration;
as Nunberg points out, “You cannot point at one of the glasses of wine sit-
ting before you at the table and say: ‘Now it’s what I call a good burgundy”’
(1993: 34). Instead, “it” picks out an “object that is simply salient in the
context or in the consciousness of participants” (1993: 33). The idea that
“it” allows deferred reference therefore makes no sense, since there is no
demonstrated object for reference to be deferred from.
Now one way to write down a Nunberg-style character for “that” would
be:
(5) JthatK= [c:[i: the object that stands in the relation that ac intends
to the object demonstrated by ac]]
But this downplays the special role of demonstrated objects in Nunberg’s sys-
tem. For Nunberg, interpretation of context-sensitive expressions is a two-
stage process: first, one must identify the features of the concrete situation
that are pointers to interpretations, and then one must develop interpreta-
tions on the basis of these pointers. A perspicuous representation of what
speakers know would separate these two processes, and the obvious way to
do this is to make demonstrated objects parameters of the context that can
be appealed to in specifying characters. (This would be particularly appro-
priate if we adopt the Chomskian hypothesis that there is a mental module
or faculty dedicated to language, and the identification of demonstrata is
an input to this faculty, not performed by the faculty itself.) For example,
letting a context c be an ordered quadruple< ac; tc; wc; oc >, where ac; tc;
and wc are as before, and oc is a demonstrated object:
(6) JthatK= [c:[i: the object that stands in the relation that ac intends
to oc]]
We have now developed context beyond the straightforward context, but
not in the direction advocated in the Simple Strategy. Context now provides
whatever information the rules we are using characters to represent require.
Because the aim is to give a better representation of the rules, call this the
Revealing Strategy:
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Context Representation (Rules Perspective - Revealing Strategy) Context rep-
resents a concrete situation by specifying those features of it that speak-
ers need to use in applying linguistic rules.
5 The Rules Perspective: Sociology
So far, we have been discussing views of semantics on which semantics aims
to characterize facts about the minds of language users. Following Chom-
sky, some proponents of this style of view draw a sharp contrast with views
of language that emphasize social aspects. But a number of theorists have
sought to develop the view that language is a social matter – perhaps none
more clearly than David Lewis (1983). On Lewis’s view, the aim of semantics
is to characterize certain social conventions. The semanticist must describe
a mapping between sentences and propositions which is such that a speaker
s generally makes an assertion using a sentence just in case that sentence
is mapped to a proposition s believes, and when s hears an assertion made
using a sentence, she generally comes to believe the proposition which that
sentence is mapped to; and such that these facts are conventional.
It is a difficult question (and one that we cannot consider here) whether
the characters of sub-sentential expressions play any representational role in
Lewis’s system (see Yalcin (2014: 39-42)). But the characters of sentences
can play a role in characterizing conventions (though, as Lewis (1980) in ef-
fect points out, this is not the only way the conventions could be described).
Suppose for the sake of simplicity that an index is just a world. Then the con-
vention might be: if a sentence S has character c, then one must utter S in
a concrete situation represented by context u only if one believes the propo-
sition represented by c(u), and if someone utters S in a concrete situation
represented by u, one should believe c(u).
On this view, rules are thought of as describing conventions (rather than
as describing the contents of certain mental representations). And this gives
another possible answer to the Character Representation Question:
Character Representation (Rules Perspective - Sociology) Characters repre-
sent social conventions.
6 Context-Shifting, Indices, and Contexts of Assessment
Our discussion throughout has tended to assume that contexts are in the
business of representing concrete situations, and the discussion has pro-
ceeded as though we are thinking of this as a situation in which the expres-
sion we are consideringmight be uttered. But I have been deliberately vague
in my “official” statements of answers to the Context Representation Ques-
tion because there are several factors that may complicate this picture.
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First, a number of theorists have claimed that character and context also
play a compositional role, because there are what Kaplan called “monsters”:
operators on character, that shift the context at which expressions in their
scope are evaluated. The idea would be that in addition to expressions like
“It is necessary that”, which have as their extensions functions from inten-
sions to truth values, there are expressions that have as their extensions func-
tions from characters to truth values. For example, Kaplan considers (but
rejects) the possibility of an operator with the following semantics:
(7) JIn some contexts it is the case thatK c;i = [s : s is the character of
a sentence. 9c0:s(c0)(ic0) = 1] (where ic0 is the index determined
by c0; see below for further discussion)
For example, an utterance by me of “In some contexts it is the case that
I am hungry” would be true if and only if the agent of some context (not
necessarily me) is hungry at the world of that context – i.e., if someone in
some world is hungry.
It is debatable whether there are (or could be) monsters in English –
Kaplan (1977: 510-2) claims that there could not be (though see Santorio
(2012); Rabern (2013)) – but a number of theorists have argued that there
are monsters in other natural languages (Schlenker (2003)). If there really
are operators on character, it is unclear what we should regard contexts as
representing. One possible view is that they play a hybrid role: when we
begin evaluating an expression, context represents a concrete situation (i.e.,
that in which we are considering the expression as being uttered), but as we
work through the compositional semantics of the expression, it can come
to represent something different (perhaps an aspect of our psychological
processing) as it is shifted by operators.
This leaves our answer to the Context Representation question mud-
dled. But as Stalnaker (2014: 214-6) points out, there is an alternative.
One can instead insist that context represents a concrete situation. This is in
effect to stipulate a representational convention that makes monsters impos-
sible. But one can capture the allegedly monstrous data by building further
parameters into the index. We can then give the expressions whose interpre-
tations are allegedly shifted by monsters constant characters, functions that
map every context to an intension that points to the relevant parameter of
the index. For example, we might let indices i be pairs of a world wi and a
speaker si, and define a shiftable “I” as follows:
(8) JIshiftableKc;i = si
Then we could introduce an operator “In some indices it is the case that”
which shifts “Ishiftable” in the way that “In some contexts it is the case that”
shifted “I”:
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(9) JIn some indices it is the case thatKc;i = [s : s is the intension of a
sentence. 9i0:s(i0) = 1]
This would deliver the result that “In some indices it is the case that Ishiftable
am hungry” is true if and only if someone in some world is hungry, much
like “In some contexts it is the case that I am hungry” purports to do. This
gives us amechanism that canmake sense of seeminglymonstrous data, even
while we insist that contexts cannot shift (since the representational role of
context is such that context shifting makes little sense).
Does this amount to a vindication of Kaplan’s prohibition on monsters?
There is need for care, since one of Kaplan’s aims was to bar operators that
shift the contribution of indexicals to what is said. But if we let the semantic
value of “I” be index-sensitive, then it is not clear that intensions are good
representations of what is said. (For example, if it is plausible that if I utter “I
am hungry”, what I am saying is something about me. But it is not clear how
to make sense of this if “I” is understood as “Ishiftable”, since the intension
of “Ishiftable am hungry” has nothing to do with me in particular; it can be
evaluated at any speaker.)
We started out with the idea that contexts represent concrete situations,
and it is natural to think that when we are trying to evaluate an actual utter-
ance, we should look to the context that represents the concrete situation in
which it was made. Monsters would complicate this picture. But some the-
orists have found reasons to think that it needed to be complicated anyway.
Perhaps the best theory of communication requires that we look not to the
concrete situation, but to the way the participants in the conversation take
things to be. (This is one of the key themes in Stalnaker’s work on context
sensitivity; see especially Stalnaker (1999). The views of context that we have
discussed so far could be modified or developed to reflect this Stalnakerian
view; I leave this as an exercise to the reader.) Or perhaps some of the phe-
nomena that we want to model depend not only on facts about the concrete
situation of use, but on facts about something else.
Perhaps themost notable recent proposal of this kind is the relativist view
that we must take into account not only a context in which a sentence might
be uttered, but also a context in which it might be assessed. This view can
be developed in two ways. First, it might be that some expressions depend
on a context of assessment for their intensions. For example, considering
the example of a televangelist who says, “Jesus loves you” to an audience
widely spread in space and possibly also time (Egan 2009), Cappelen (2009)
maintains that what is said depends not only on the concrete situation in
which the sentence is uttered, but also on the concrete situation in which the
sentence is heard and interpreted (since this determines the contribution of
“you”). If this is correct, then we should see contexts as representing at least
two distinct concrete situations. (Whether we do this by letting characters be
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functions from two contexts to intensions, or bymaintaining a single context
but adding more parameters, looks like a technical matter of little interest
as long as we are clear on what we are representing.)
The second way of developing a relativist view relies on a role of context
that we have so far ignored. When we assess the truth of an utterance, we
need both a context and an index. And when we evaluate utterances, we
typically begin with an index that corresponds closely to the context. For
example, on the assumption that an index is just a world, when we evaluate
whether an utterance is true, we will begin by letting the index be the world
of the context.
So at least in many cases, context determines the index at which we eval-
uate utterances. But it may be that the concrete situation of utterance does
not include facts that are relevant to some evaluations. (For example, sup-
pose that the future is open and I say “There will be a sea battle tomorrow”.
It is compatible with all of the facts about the concrete situation of utterance
that there will be a sea battle, and also compatible with the concrete situa-
tion of utterance that there will not be. But it may make sense in evaluating
the utterance later to take into account the later facts.) And it may be that
our judgments about when it is appropriate to agree and disagree with what
other speakers say, and to retract our own utterances, are best modelled by
a system that takes into account features of the concrete situation in which
an utterance is assessed (and not just the concrete situation in which it was
made).
This is the second way a relativist view might be developed: by letting
features of the index be initialized by the context of assessment. For exam-
ple, suppose we assume that intensions represent what is said, but let indices
be pairs of a world and a speaker < wi; si >; and suppose that our repre-
sentation of what is said by an utterance of 10 is a function from indices to
truth values that maps i to truth just in case chili tastes good to si in wi:
(10) Chili is tasty.
The question then is: when we evaluate an utterance of (10) for truth, what
index do we use? For example, suppose that I am evaluating Jonathan’s
assertion of (10), and that Jonathan loves chili and I hate it. Then I can
evaluate what Jonathan said at <the actual world, Jonathan>, in which case
I should regard it as true, or at <the actual world, Derek>, in which case I
should regard it as false. The relativist claims that the latter proposal better
fits our actual practice (e.g., because I might regard myself as disagreeing
with Jonathan, and might want to argue with him) (MacFarlane 2014). If
that is right, then again, we will need to build information representing the
concrete situation of assessment into context.
How does this change our proposed answers to the Context Represen-
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tation question? We could, if we were interested in being fully explicit, state
explicitly relativist and non-relativist versions of each of the possibilities de-
scribed above; but for the purposes of this paper, it is enough if we keep
in mind that a complete theory that maintains that contexts are represent-
ing concrete situations must describe not only how they do this, but what
situations are represented.
7 Conclusion
One’s views about context and character will depend on what we take the
task of semantics to be. What is a semantic theory a theory of, and how does
it represent its target?
Although some of the questions discussed in this chapter have been
debated in some detail (if not in quite these terms) in the literature on
epistemic contextualism, others have barely been broached. Do contextu-
alist views give an easy victory to the sceptic (a worry discussed in DeRose
(2004))? The answer will depend in part on what we take context to rep-
resent; for example, views that take context to represent how the conver-
sational participants take things to be may fare differently than views that
take context to represent the concrete situation in which the conversation
is in fact taking place. Do contextualists have a problem about semantic
ignorance and error (as Schiffer (1996) and many others contend)? The
answer will depend on what we take characters to represent; semantic ig-
norance manifests quite differently for views that aim to characterize rules
represented by speakers than in views that aim to characterize a social con-
vention, or that aim to make predictions about what is said. Attention to the
titular question of this paper may not resolve these debates, but it is crucial
to understanding what is at stake.
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